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Abstract
We consider the efficiency implications of policies to reduce global carbon
emissions in a world with pre-existing tax distortions.  We first note that the weak
double-dividend, the proposition that the welfare improvement from a tax reform
where environmental taxes are used to lower distorting taxes must be greater than the
welfare improvement from a reform where the environmental taxes are returned in a
lump sum fashion, need not hold in a world with multiple distortions.  We then present
a large-scale computable general equilibrium model of the world economy with
distortionary taxation.  We use this model to evaluate a number of policies to reduce
carbon emissions.  We find that the weak double dividend is not obtained in a number
of European countries.  Results also demonstrate the point that the interplay between
carbon policies and pre-existing taxes can differ markedly across countries.  Thus one










The past ten years has seen a tremendous amount of interest in the interaction
between distortionary taxation and optimal environmental policy.  Much progress in
our understanding of this interaction has occurred, and general equilibrium modeling
has played a key role.  A popular but often ill-defined concept is the "double
dividend," the idea that imposing an environmental tax can both improve economic
performance and the environment.  The attraction of a double dividend arose in the
1980s from the conjunction of an increased concern about climate change and the
consequent need for a policy response on the one hand and the U.S. federal budget
deficit on the other hand.  Environmental taxes appeared desirable given both these
concerns.
Goulder [23] provides a useful taxonomy of double dividends as well as an
explanation of their appeal.
1  Goulder distinguishes a "strong" and "weak" double
dividend.  A strong double dividend occurs when welfare is increased in response to
an environmental tax regardless of the improvement in environmental quality.  Given
the great difficulties associated with quantifying the economic benefits of an improved
environment, a strong double dividend is appealing in that a case can be made for an
environmental tax without having to worry about the magnitude of the environmental
gains.  It is possible for welfare (net of environmental improvements) to increase in
response to a green tax reform if the environmental tax revenues are used to lower a
                                                
1  See Bovenberg [12] for an update to that literature.2
particularly egregious distorting tax.  This simply points out the obvious fact that any
tax reform to replace a highly distorting tax with a less distorting taxes is, in general, a
good idea.  See Bovenberg and Goulder [13] for further discussion of this point.  We
find, as discussed below, that a strong double dividend is unlikely for the climate
policy targets in the Kyoto Protocol.
A "weak" double dividend occurs when the welfare improvement from a tax
reform where environmental taxes are used to lower distorting taxes is greater than the
welfare improvement from a reform where the environmental taxes are returned in a
lump sum fashion.  A general consensus has emerged that the weak double dividend is
an uncontroversial idea; it just says that lowering a distorting tax is better than simply
handing out the money. We show below, however, that in an economy with multiple
distortions, a weak double dividend need not occur.  Moreover, we argue that climate
policies under consideration in response to global warming will likely not provide a
weak double dividend in a number of European countries.
We proceed as follows.  In the next section, we provide some intuition for why
a weak double dividend need not hold.  We then turn in the third section to a
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model.   Most general equilibrium models
typically focus on a single country.  The MIT Emissions and Policy Analysis (EPPA)
model allows us to carry out cross-country comparisons as well as analyses that
evaluate international policy schemes (e.g. Kyoto) in a world with pre-existing3
taxation.  Section 4 provides results from a number of experiments we carry out using
the model.  Section 5 concludes.
II. Must a Weak Double Dividend Occur?
A weak-double dividend arises when welfare is increased by using
environmental tax revenues to lower distorting taxes as opposed to returning the
revenues in a lump-sum fashion.  Economists view this as an uncontroversial
proposition.
2  In this section, we provide an intuitive demonstration that the weak
double-dividend need not hold in general.
The following simple model will help explain the intuition.
3  Consider an
economy with a representative agent whose utility is a function of consumption of two
goods (X, Y), leisure (V) and environmental quality (E):
(1) U(X,Y,V;E)
Environmental quality falls with increased amounts of pollution (Z) which is
associated with the production of one of the two commodities (good Y for specificity).
Consumers maximize utility subject to the budget constraint
(2) pXX + pYY = L + T
where pX and pY are the consumer prices for X and Y, the gross wage rate equals 1
(labor is taken as the numeraire good) and T is a lump-sum transfer.  Leisure and labor
                                                
2 Starrett [39] notes, for example, that "this result is quite general and reflects the fact that we are
always better off using the green tax revenue to reduce some other distorting tax rather then [sic] (for
example) returning it in a lump sum manner." (p. 36)  See also the discussion in Goulder [23] on pages
159-161.
3 See Babiker, et al. [5] for a full model and some numerical results.4
sum to a fixed time endowment.  Consumer prices are related to producer prices as
follows:
(3a) pX = 1 + tX
(3b) pY = qY(tZ)(1+tY)
where tx and ty are commodity taxes levied on goods X and Y, respectively, to raise
revenue, and tz is an environmental tax levied on Z.  Initially tz equals zero.  Increases
in the environmental tax raise the marginal cost - and hence the producer price - of Y,
denoted by qY.  The government budget constraint is given by
(4) tXX + tYqYY + tZZ = T,
again noting that tz initially equals zero.
Consider the options in Table 1 for effecting a revenue neutral tax reform in
response to a new environmental tax initiative (tz):
Table 1: Revenue Neutral Tax Policies
Policy Hold Fixed Adjust
1t X, tY T
2t Y, T tX
3t X, T tY
A weak double dividend occurs when the welfare gain from policy 2 (or 3) is greater
than the welfare gain from policy 1.
A weak double dividend can be easily shown to occur if commodity Y is
untaxed in the model above.  Policy 1 raises a tax on pollution and uses the revenue to
lower a lump-sum tax.
4  Policy 2 raises a tax on pollution by the same amount as in
                                                
4 Or equivalently, it increases a lump-sum subsidy.5
policy 1 but returns the tax revenue by reducing the tax on X.  To see that a weak
double dividend must hold, consider policy 1 run in reverse: lower a tax on pollution
and finance this tax reduction by increasing a lump-sum tax.  Call this policy 1r (for
reverse).  Now run policy 2 followed by policy 1r.  This is equivalent to a policy
which lowers the tax on X and raises a lump-sum tax in a revenue neutral manner.
This policy experiment clearly raises welfare from which we can conclude that the
welfare gain from policy 2 exceeds the welfare gain from policy 1.  The weak double
dividend in this simple model in which there is only one distorting tax (other than the
tax on the polluting good) is simply a restatement of the principle that lump-sum taxes
are preferred to distortionary taxes on efficiency grounds.
To see why a weak double dividend need not hold more generally, assume that
pY >> pX > 0 (perhaps because of a high rate of taxation on Y relative to X) and that
utility is weakly separable between leisure and the two commodities and that the sub-
utility function over commodities is homothetic.  An implication of this preference
structure is that the optimal commodity tax structure (ignoring the environmental
problem) is one of uniform commodity taxes (Deaton [17]).  Thus, ignoring
environmental considerations, a revenue neutral tax reform would be welfare
enhancing if it reduced the difference between pY and pX.  With this preference
structure, it would be preferable on efficiency grounds to implement an environmental
tax reform that returned the revenue lump-sum rather than in a way that increased the
pY-pX  differential.  In other words, policy 1 in Table 1 above would be preferred on6
efficiency grounds to policy 2 since this latter policy increases pY - pX.  The policy
prescription from this simply analysis is that in an economy with multiple distortions,
one must choose carefully which distortions to reduce, or one can do worse than a
lump sum redistribution. Put simply, there is no theoretical basis to conclude that  a
weak double dividend must exist.  We next demonstrate in a large-scale CGE model
that climate policies under consideration in response to global warming will likely not
provide a weak double dividend in a number of European countries.
III. Empirical Estimation of Revenue Recycling
Empirical investigations of the potential importance of the double dividend in
climate policy date to the early 1990s, with several different types of models used (see
for example Shackelton, et al. [38]).  The models include Keynesian-type macro-
econonomic models such as the DRI and LINK models, econometrically estimated
general equilibrium models (e.g. DGEM, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen [32]), and
parameterized CGE models (e.g. Goulder [22]; Boyd, et al. [15]). A comparison of
these early results for the US (Hourcade, et al. [25]) showed widely varying results.
The Keynesian-type economic models found very large strong double-dividends from
investment tax credits. A problem with the econometrically based Keynesian-type
macroeconomic models, however, is that theoretical underpinnings of the estimated
relationships are weak.  DGEM results found strong double-dividends from corporate
income tax cuts as did the DRI model.  In contrast, the parameterized CGE model of
Goulder did not find evidence of strong double dividends; recycling revenue to the7
investment tax credit ended up just balancing losses from the carbon tax itself.   These
results were in terms of discounted present value of GDP and thus do not directly
measure welfare.
Later reviews (Goulder [22]; Parry [34]; Bovenberg [12]) have helped to
clarify issues surrounding the Double Dividend.  Since then there has been more
empirical analysis and speculation on the existence of the double-dividend in other
countries, particularly Europe, as reviewed by Hourcade and Shukla [26]. One CGE
analysis posited a strong double dividend in Europe (Carraro and Soubeyran [16]) but
another empirical analyses using a CGE model suggested little evidence of a strong
double dividend in France (Bernard and Vielle [11]).  A Keynesian-type model
estimated for Europe systematically found a large strong double dividend (Barker [9]).
There has been very little investigation of the potential double-dividend benefits in
developing countries, in part perhaps, because developing countries have not agreed to
an emissions cap.  An exception is Boyd and Ibarrarian [14] who investigate the
potential for a double dividend in Mexico, should Mexico seek to control emissions,
but find little support for its existence except under unusual circumstances.
To comparably study the existence of a double-dividend in different countries,
we employ the Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, a recursive
dynamic multi-regional general equilibrium model of the world economy that has been
developed for analysis of climate change policy (see, for example, Babiker, et al. [1];
Babiker, et al. [7]; Babiker, et al. [8]; Ellerman and Sue Wing [19]; Babiker and8
Eckaus [2]; and Babiker and Jacoby [3].  Previous versions of the model have been
used extensively for this purpose (e.g., Jacoby, et al. [29]; Ellerman and Decaux [18];
Jacoby and Sue Wing [30]; and Reilly, et al. [36]).  The current version of EPPA is
built on a comprehensive energy-economy data set (GTAP4-E
5) that accommodates a
consistent representation of energy markets in physical units as well as detailed
accounts of regional production and bilateral trade flows.  The base year for the model
is 1995 and it is solved recursively at 5-year intervals.  A full documentation of EPPA
is provided in Babiker, et al. [6]. In this paper, we use a new version of the model
(EPPA-EU) including a breakdown for the European Union. The reference case for
Europe in EPPA-EU is presented and compared with other economic models in
Viguier, et al. [40].  As significant advantage of this approach compared with previous
work is that a common method and data set is applied to all countries and the cross-
country results are thus comparable.  As reviewed above, the existing empirical
studies are for the most part based on single country models.
III-1.  EU Disaggregation
EPPA-EU extended the current version of EPPA by bringing in a detailed
breakdown of the EU and incorporating an industry and a household transport sectors
for each region.  The regional, sectoral, and factors aggregation shown in Table 2,
together with the substitution elasticities in Table 3 completely specify the benchmark
equilibrium.
                                                
5 For description of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database see Hertel [24].9
The European Union is disaggregated into 9 countries and 1 region
representing the Rest of Europe (ROE).  Four out of the 9 EU countries (France,
Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands) were aggregated together with ROE in the GTAP4-
E database.  We disaggregated this region using data from the GTAP-5 Pre-release
that provides a complete disaggregation of the EU.
6  To accomplish this task we
developed an optimization algorithm that uses the economic structure of these 4
countries in GTAP-5 Pre-release while imposing the output, demand, and trade
balances for their corresponding aggregate region in GTAP4-E.  This allowed us to
leave unchanged all other regions of the standard EPPA based on GTAP4-E.
III-2.  Transportation Sector Disaggregation
A second change in this version of the model is the disaggregation of the
transportation sector.  With transportation disaggregated, there are nine output sectors
for each of the 22 regions in EPPA-EU, as shown in the left-hand column of Table 2.
The EPPA model also includes future or “backstop” sources of fuels and electricity,
but they do not play a significant role in this analysis which looks only out to 2010.
Eight of the production sectors follow the standard EPPA definitions.  The GTAP
database does not include a separate transportation sector within industry, nor does it
contain a separate category for private automobile services in the household sector.
We followed the methodology developed by Babiker, et al. [1] for the United States to
                                                
6 Though GTAP-5 Pre-release has all 9 of these countries broken out we chose to focus on
disaggregating only the 4 largest of these countries.10
break out transportation from EPPA’s Other Industry sector and to create a household
own-supplied transportation sector (i.e. private automobiles).
Table 2. Dimensions of the EPPA-EU Model
Production Sectors Name Countries and Regions Name
Non-Energy Annex B
1. Agriculture AGRI United States USA
2. Energy-Intensive Industries EINT Japan JPN
3. Other Industries and Services OIND Europe EEC
4. Transportation TRAN Denmark DNK
Energy Finland FIN
5. Crude Oil OIL France FR
6. Natural Gas GAS Germany DEU
7. Refined Oil REFOIL Italy ITA
8. Coal COAL Netherlands NLD
9. Electricity ELEC Spain ESP
Future Energy Supply Sweden SWE
10. Carbon Liquids United Kingdom GBR
11. Carbon-Free Electric Rest of EU
a ROE
Other OECD OOE
Households (Consumers) Sector H Former Soviet Union FSU
Central European Associates EET
Primary Factors Non-Annex B
1. Labor L Brazil BRA
2. Capital K China CHN
3. Fixed Factors for Fuel India IND
And Agriculture Energy Exporting Countries EEX
Dynamic Asian Economies DAE
Rest of World ROW
a Includes Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal.11
Table 3. Model Parameters
Parameter Description Value
σERVA Elasticity of substitution between energy resource composite and value-added
(agriculture only)
0.6
σER Substitution between land and energy-material bundle (agriculture only) 0.6
σAE Substitution between energy and material composite (agriculture only) 0.3
σVA Substitution between labor & capital
a 1
σENOE Substitution between electric and non electric energy 0.5
σEN Substitution among non-electric energy
b 1
σGR Substitution between fixed factor and the rest of inputs 0.6
σEVA Substitution between energy and value added composite
c 0.4
σDM Armington substitution between domestic and imports
d 3
σMM Armington substitution across imports:                           - Non energy goods




σCS Temporal substitution between consumption and saving 1
σC Substitution across consumption goods
f
G0 Labor supply annual growth rate in efficiency units:       - Developed countries
                                                                                          - Developing countries
1-3%
2.5-6%
a Except nuclear in which it is 0.5.
b Except for electricity where coal and oil generation substitute at 0.3 among themselves and at 1.0 with
gas.
c Except energy intensive and other industry where it is 0.5.
d Except Electricity where it is 0.3.
e Except refined oil (6) and electricity (0.5).
f Varies across countries and is updated with income recursively to reflect income elasticities based on an
econometrically estimated equation. See Babiker et al. 2001 for details.
The basic approach for the TRANS sectors is to use GTAP’s trade and
transport sector that combines transport with trade margins in combination with data
from Input-Output tables produced by the European statistical office (Eurostat).  These
tables provide the data to disaggregate trade margins from transportation for each
European country.  For the other regions in the model, we used the US input-output
coefficients from Babiker, et al. [1].  The TRANS industry supplies transportation
services (both passenger and freight) to other sectors and to households.12
We have also made adjustments directly to the Household (H) sector to
represent own-supplied transportation services, primarily that provided by personal
automobiles.  Households produce transportation services for their own consumption
using inputs from the Other Industry Products (OIND) and Refined Oil sectors.
Consumption expenditure of private households reported by Eurostat [20] and energy
statistics from the International Energy Agency ([27, [28] along with the coefficients
reported in Babiker, et al. [1] were used to separate the household purchases that are
part of household production of transportation from other household purchases.
The new breakout yields a sector of own-supplied personal transportation
(private automobiles) separate from other household activities, and a separate
transportation sector in industry that supplies transport services to both industry (i.e.,
freight transportation and any passenger transportation purchased by business) and
households (purchased transportation service, mainly passenger transportation services
such as air and rail service).  Services from private automobiles involve inputs from
OIND that include the automobile itself, repairs, insurance, parking, and vehicle fuel
from the REFOIL sector. The procedure involves allocating the total household use of
OIND and REFOIL between household transportation and other household uses.
III-3.  Incorporating Labor Leisure Choice
Critical to the investigation of the distortionary effect of taxation are the effects
of factor taxes on factor usage.  We have adjusted the Social Accounting Matrices for
OECD regions in the database to account for the leisure component in the utility13
function, to represent the labor-leisure tradeoff and thus the effect of taxes on labor
supply.  The standard version of EPPA models labor as inelastically supplied. Based
on the literature (e.g., Goulder [22]; Fullerton and Metcalf [21]; and Bovenberg [12])
we have assumed a leisure-labor ratio of 0.25, and an uncompensated labor supply
elasticity of 0.25.  We investigate the sensitivity of this latter assumption below.
III-4.  Incorporating factor taxes and non-energy consumption taxes
To correctly assess the economic impacts of climate change policy proposals,
it is important to have a good representation of the existing tax distortions. In
particular, incorporating taxes will be important to consider the interaction between
environmental policy and pre-existing tax distortions.  Adding taxes to the dataset
used to calibrate a CGE model for any particular country is not particularly difficult.
What is more challenging is to construct a methodology that is consistent across
countries and relies on readily available data.  Mendoza, et al. [33] sets out a method
by which effective tax rates on labor and capital income as well as consumption can be
calculated from National Accounts data from OECD for different countries.  By using
OECD data, the constructed rates are consistent across countries and time and are
amenable for inclusion in the GTAP data base, which is particularly poor in its
representation of existing consumption and factor taxes.  We follow this approach in
our work. The detail of this methodology is explained in the appendix and the
computed tax rates for a number of developed countries are reported in Table 4 for the
year 1995.14
 
Table 4. Tax Rates for 1995
Country Consumption Labor Capital
Denmark 33.2% 49.8% 41.5%
Finland 26.0% 48.4% 35.0%
France 19.7% 49.3% 24.7%
Germany 16.7% 43.5% 24.7%
Great Britain 17.3% 25.0% 46.3%
Italy 15.8% 47.0% 32.6%
Japan 6.0% 27.8% 44.3%
Netherlands 18.5% 51.2% 28.4%
Spain 13.7% 36.4% 19.9%
Sweden 22.8% 52.2% 41.6%
United States 5.6% 27.2% 39.9%
Source: Authors' calculations.  See text for description of methodology and sources.
Consumption taxes, reported here inclusive of energy taxes, are high in Europe
relative to Japan and the United States.  The United States does not rely on a Value
Added Tax as do the other countries and Japan's VAT is both a low tax VAT and
subject to a relatively narrow base.  The countries included in Table 4 differ in their
relative taxation of capital and labor.  It has long been argued that the double taxation
of corporate capital income unfairly burdens capital income.  The relative taxation of
capital and labor in the United States in Table 4 lends support to that argument.
In terms of modeling, we have treated factor earnings from the GTAP database
as gross earnings. Accordingly, we use the factor taxes schedule in Table 4 to compute15
the net factor flow services and maintain the income-expenditure balance in the
database by transferring the tax revenues to the consumer as lump sum.  Also the
consumer expenditure on non-energy goods gross of tax has been adjusted to reflect
the tax in Table 4 and the income-expenditure balance is maintained as in the factor
tax case by lump sum transfer of the tax revenues to the consumer.
As noted above factor payments in GTAP are gross (of tax) payments and so
overestimate the amount of capital and labor used in production.  Once we break out
factor taxes, we obtain the same amount of output with fewer inputs.  One implication
of the higher productivity of factors is that welfare in the reference scenarios was
initially higher in the EPPA model with taxes than in the model without taxes, but for
comparability purposes the model was rebenchmarked by lowering exogenous growth
in labor productivity so that growth in welfare was nearly identical (see Table 5).
Productivity growth in EPPA is essentially Harrod-neutral (i.e. labor-augmenting),
7
and this exogenous growth factor is set to achieve exogenous GDP growth targets (e.g.
in the reference we approximately match IMF GDP growth projections as described in
Babiker et al. 2001). Without the rebenchmarking GDP growth is much more rapid
than other standard forecasts.
                                                
7 The Autonomous Energy Efficiency Increase (AEEI) increases productivity and we separately
describe improvements in the fixed factor input to agriculture (i.e. land) that also contribute to
economy-wide growth but these factors contribute only a very small share to overall growth.16
Table 5.  Reference Welfare in EPPA
Taxes Included Taxes Excluded
2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010
USA 1.253 1.500 1.785 1.222 1.447 1.705
JPN 1.102 1.321 1.530 1.090 1.256 1.435
GBR 1.233 1.451 1.693 1.209 1.418 1.648
DEU 1.172 1.379 1.589 1.159 1.370 1.579
DNK 1.334 1.616 1.938 1.294 1.588 1.916
SWE 1.342 1.695 2.087 1.292 1.626 2.006
FIN 1.366 1.768 2.252 1.352 1.749 2.227
FRA 1.175 1.333 1.508 1.157 1.300 1.455
ITA 1.140 1.295 1.453 1.118 1.259 1.399
NLD 1.207 1.416 1.642 1.186 1.373 1.572
ESP 1.228 1.484 1.791 1.205 1.433 1.693
REU 1.214 1.415 1.650 1.188 1.362 1.556
OOE 1.196 1.398 1.619 1.181 1.370 1.579
EEX 1.157 1.314 1.490 1.159 1.316 1.492
CHN 1.362 1.793 2.363 1.364 1.794 2.364
FSU 1.048 1.220 1.465 1.050 1.221 1.466
IND 1.335 1.757 2.307 1.336 1.758 2.307
EET 1.041 1.134 1.315 1.041 1.135 1.315
DAE 1.058 1.276 1.523 1.182 1.388 1.634
BRA 1.177 1.365 1.581 1.178 1.365 1.581
ROW 1.154 1.325 1.521 1.155 1.326 1.522
Welfare is indexed at 1.000 in 1995.  All calculations from EPPA model.  See Table 2
for country codes.  Labor and capital taxes were not introduced for non-OECD
countries.  Changes in welfare for these regions are small and due to trade effects
resulting from the changes in OECD countries.
The rebenchmarking of the model also assured that carbon emissions were not
appreciably changed in the reference scenario with taxes explicitly incorporated.
IV. Kyoto Policy in a World With Tax Distortions
At the Third Conference of the Parties (COP-3) to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in Kyoto, Annex B
8
Parties committed to reducing, either individually or jointly, their total emissions of17
six greenhouse gases (GHGs) by at least 5 percent within the period 2008 to 2012,
relative to these gases’ 1990 levels.
The European Union (EU) is a full Party to the UNFCCC and a signatory of
the Kyoto Protocol, has accepted a quantitative absolute reduction of 8 percent from
1990 levels of its GHG emissions.  Article 4 of the Protocol allows the EU to allocate
its target among the Member States.  A political agreement on that redistribution was
reached at the environmental Council meeting in June 1998, and is referred to as the
“Burden Sharing” Agreement (BSA).  Table 6 shows the BSA adopted at the
environmental Council meeting by Member States on June 1998. The sharing scheme
specifies emissions targets for each member country with the objective to reflect
opportunities and constraints that vary from one country to another, and to share
“equitably” the economic burden of climate protection.
The BSA was meant to equitably allocate the burden of the EU-wide cap
among member countries.  The wide difference in reduction targets for different
countries reflects, to a large degree, the very different experiences of EU countries
between 1990 and 1995 (the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997), with the UK and
Germany exhibiting large declines in emissions.  In the UK this was due to a
significant conversion to natural gas in electric power production because of the newly
available off-shore gas resources.  In Germany, this was due to reunification and the
resultant shut-down of inefficient industrial plants in the former East Germany.
                                                                                                                                            
8 Annex B refers to the group of developed countries comprising of OECD (as defined in 1990), Russia18
Differential expected growth and relative income levels was also a factor.  As we
show below and as has been explored in greater detail elsewhere (Viguier, et al., 2001)
even with this differentiation the cost burden varies across EU member states.
Table 6. Burden Sharing Agreement for 2010
















Total European Union 92.0
We next report results from the EPPA model of caps on carbon emissions in
Annex B to achieve the carbon reductions set forth in the Kyoto Protocol, including
the United States.  We model the policy by implementing carbon permits sold by each
national government with revenues from permit sales recycled to the country's
representative agent through a lump-sum rebate within each country.
9  Below, we
consider alternative revenue recycling policies.  We consider carbon emissions from
                                                                                                                                            
and the East European Associates.
9  This is equivalent to each country implementing a carbon tax (rebated lump-sum) at a level sufficient
to achieve the reductions required under Kyoto.19
energy only, ignoring forest sinks for carbon and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) and
in all cases here we assume that the caps are met domestically without emissions
trading among countries. These assumptions require fairly sizable reductions in
emissions from reference so the welfare effects are evident. This differs considerably
from all that is included in the Protocol but serves as a convenient scenario against
which to evaluate the double dividend issue.
10   Table 7 reports changes in welfare
relative to reference scenarios.
                                                
10 As finally negotiated in Marrakech with the US not participating, allowances for extra forest sinks for
carbon, other GHG abatement potential, and with full emissions trading among the countries that
remained parties to the Protocol, it turns out that the Kyoto cap is only marginally binding.  Excess
allocation of permits to Russia, Ukraine, and other transition countries in Europe (i.e. an allocation
beyond their projected emissions) means that virtually no actual reductions in any country are required
if these credits can be applied in other countries as allowed under the Protocol (Babiker, et al. [4]).
While that result is an important policy conclusion in itself, it means the permit price is near zero, there
is little possibility for revenue generation, negligible welfare effects of the policy, and little scope for
revenue recycling making it an uninteresting case for the questions we consider here. Many European
countries may choose to meet their targets mainly through domestic action as the EC originally objected
to full emissions trading and nothing in the Protocol requires that they use international credits to the
full extent they are available.20
Table 7.  Welfare Costs of Kyoto (No Trading)
Taxes Excluded Taxes Included
2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020
USA -0.61 -0.82 -1.27 -0.65 -0.86 -1.27
JPN -0.63 -0.81 -1.11 -0.62 -0.80 -1.08
GBR -1.23 -1.44 -1.99 -1.05 -1.22 -1.69
DEU -0.87 -0.90 -1.24 -0.77 -0.79 -1.09
DNK -4.26 -4.21 -4.63 -3.82 -3.77 -4.05
SWE -3.63 -4.24 -4.91 -3.46 -3.98 -4.56
FIN -2.26 -2.84 -3.56 -1.86 -2.34 -2.93
FRA -0.71 -0.95 -1.42 -0.70 -0.93 -1.36
ITA -1.14 -1.55 -3.30 -1.26 -1.70 -3.30
NLD -5.08 -5.42 -5.98 -4.67 -5.11 -5.72
ESP -3.34 -4.40 -6.11 -3.13 -4.17 -5.83
REU -1.29 -2.06 -3.33 -1.27 -2.03 -3.28
OOE -2.27 -2.67 -2.57 -1.96 -2.30 -2.20
EEX -3.54 -4.08 -3.18 -3.62 -4.16 -3.29
CHN 0.27 0.29 -0.14 0.26 0.27 -0.16
FSU -2.22 -2.54 -1.19 -2.27 -2.59 -1.23
IND 1.10 1.24 0.23 1.11 1.25 0.24
EET 0.75 0.80 0.10 0.74 0.78 0.07
DAE 0.53 0.53 -0.17 0.53 0.51 -0.20
BRA 0.45 0.46 0.09 0.45 0.46 0.08
ROW 0.13 0.10 -0.22 0.12 0.07 -0.24
This table reports percentage changes in EV relative to the reference scenarios (either
with or without taxes). Labor and capital taxes were not introduced for non-OECD
countries.  Changes in welfare for these regions are small and due to trade effects
resulting from the changes in OECD countries.
Given the improvement in welfare in the reference we observed before
rebenchmarking, we thought it possible that simply including the tax wedges might
change the costs of meeting a target.  We hypothesized that resource substitutions
might be less costly, thus making it easier for firms to shift out of carbon intensive
production in response to Kyoto.  In other words, fewer resources would need to be21
shifted across sectors for a given reduction in carbon use.
11  As can be seen from Table
7, there was little difference in the cost of Kyoto when simulated using the standard
EPPA version and the tax version of EPPA. For the most part, the remaining
differences appear due to the fact that even after rebenchmarking there remained some
minor differences between the two reference scenarios.  The inclusion of fuel taxes did
not by itself change estimates of the cost of Kyoto policy when the carbon revenues
are recycled in a lump sum manner, nor do the differences in tax rates for capital,
labor, and consumption taxes appear to explain differences in estimates of the costs
among countries.  The standard version of EPPA includes distorting energy taxes and,
elsewhere, it has been shown that the presence or absence of energy taxes does affect
the cost of Kyoto substantially (Babiker, et al. [8]).
We next report on simulations in which carbon permits are used to achieve
Kyoto with tax recycling of the proceeds a possibility, here focusing on only the tax
version of EPPA where the results across scenarios are strictly comparable.  We
consider four possible uses of carbon tax revenues as described in Table 8.
Table 8. Tax Recycling Scenarios
NRP Lump Sum Recycling
LRP Labor Tax Recycling
CRP Non-Energy Consumer Tax Recycling
LCRP 50% Labor and 50% Consumer Tax
Recycling
All scenarios impose caps on carbon emissions to achieve
Kyoto reductions.  Caps are achieved through permits sold by
the national governments.
                                                
11 Without rebenchmarking the results would have been convoluted with the fact that the required
reductions would have been larger in the tax version of EPPA.22
The first scenario returns carbon permit revenues to the representative agent in a lump
sum fashion.  The other three scenarios use proceeds to lower some distorting tax (or
set of taxes).   Table 9 reports the change in welfare in 2010 relative to the reference
scenario for the various proposals. We report here only the impacts for those countries
with binding commitments under the Kyoto Protocol as originally signed.
12
Table 9. Welfare Changes with Recycling
NRP LRP CRP LCRP
USA -0.65% -0.49% -0.57% -0.53%
JPN -0.62% -0.56% -0.54% -0.54%
GBR -1.05% -0.97% -0.91% -0.94%
DEU -0.77% -0.69% -0.55% -0.62%
DNK -3.82% -3.54% -3.23% -3.38%
SWE -3.46% -3.27% -3.03% -3.14%
FIN -1.86% -1.67% -1.45% -1.55%
FRA -0.70% -0.64% -0.76% -0.70%
ITA -1.26% -1.08% -1.22% -1.14%
NLD -4.67% -4.45% -4.87% -4.65%
ESP -3.13% -3.01% -3.32% -3.16%
REU -1.27% -1.17% -1.44% -1.31%
OOE -1.96% -1.88% -1.84% -1.85%
Average -1.94% -1.80% -1.83% -1.81%
Welfare changes are relative to the reference scenario.
Average is an unweighted average of the changes for the
countries or country groups
Not surprisingly, carbon reductions to achieve Kyoto with lump sum recycling
reduce welfare relative to the reference scenario.  Welfare losses range from a low of
0.6 percent in the United States and Japan to over 4 percent for the Netherlands.   The
Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden suffer large losses because 1) they agreed to large
cuts in emissions as part of the European burden sharing agreement by which the EC
                                                
12 As shown elsewhere (Babiker, et al. [8]) implementation of the Kyoto Protocol can have strong
effects on non-participating countries through international trade, largely through energy markets, but23
intends to meet its target under the Kyoto accord and 2) emissions growth in those
countries since 1990 has been more rapid than in other European countries.
13
The next three columns provide results for various tax reductions.  In no case
does welfare rise relative to the reference scenario.  In other words, a strong double
dividend is not possible in any of the EU countries or the United States and Japan as a
result of a carbon tax to achieve Kyoto.  The use of carbon taxes to reduce labor taxes
does give rise to a weak double dividend.  Welfare losses under the LRP scenario are
always lower than under the NRP scenario.
Interestingly, the weak double dividend does not hold in all cases when carbon
tax revenues are used to lower non-energy consumption taxes (CRP).  France, the
Netherlands, and Spain are all better off with lump-sum recycling of the carbon permit
revenues than if the alternative is to reduce non-energy consumption taxes.  The
failure of the weak double dividend to hold simply reflects the existence of distorting
energy consumption taxes that have not been reduced in this policy experiment.
Intercommodity distortions are increased by a selective reduction in consumption
taxation; second best considerations mean that the weak double dividend is not a
universal phenomenon.
                                                                                                                                            
that is not the focus of the analysis presented here.
13 Sweden actually was allowed a four percent growth in emissions for 2010 relative to 1990.  Its
emissions in the reference scenario grow by 44 percent however. Germany and the UK agreed to very
large cuts in emissions from 1990 (i.e.~20%) but there emissions fell by large amounts between 1990
and 1995 so that these cuts do not involve as large a cut from their projected reference emissions in
2010.24
We next turn to the question of whether a strong double dividend is possible by
varying the labor supply elasticity.  Increasing factor supply elasticities will increase
the distortions from pre-existing taxes and so increase the probability of a strong
double dividend.  Table 10 reports welfare changes in 2010 relative to the reference
scenario for differing labor supply elasticities.
Table 10. LRP Scenario:
















This table reports welfare changes
relative to the reference scenario.
We draw a couple of conclusions from this analysis.  First, an increase of the
labor supply elasticity to 0.5 is insufficient to achieve a strong double dividend under
the Kyoto Protocol.  Moreover, an increase to 1.0 is required before we begin to see a
possible strong double dividend.  Such an estimate of the labor supply elasticity is so
far out of the bounds of reasonable estimates as to preclude the existence of a strong
double dividend.  Second, Table 10 illustrates sharp welfare differences between the
United States and many EU countries.  This illustrates the important point that policy25
conclusions drawn from studies of the United States may not be transferable to EU
countries (and vice versa).
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V. Conclusion
We began with the observation that the weak double dividend does not hold
unambiguously.  Relative tax distortions play an important role in this result.  Revenue
recycling through a tax cut can be welfare worsening relative to lump-sum recycling if
the tax cut increases the relative distortion among goods.  This suggests that a careful
assessment of just which distortions to reduce is necessary or one can do worse than
lump sum recycling.
15  While this result is of theoretical interest, it turns out also to be
of important practical interest.  As the results from the EPPA model demonstrate, the
weak double dividend is unlikely to hold for a number of European countries when
policies are considered to reduce carbon emissions.  This result can be traced to the
high existing energy taxes in most European countries.  Placing a carbon constraint on
top of existing fuel taxes raises the effective tax on fuels still further and then
redistributing the revenue by reducing existing taxes on labor further worsens the
relative distortions between energy and labor.  The result is that the interplay between
carbon policies and pre-existing taxes can differ markedly across countries, depending
greatly on the existing levels of different distortionary taxes that exist in an economy.
                                                
14 This point is reinforced by another scenario in which we fix the labor supply elasticity at 0.25 and
measure the marginal welfare cost of carbon abatement for various levels of reductions.  Results
reported in Babiker, et al. [5] show very different marginal welfare losses across countries.
15 The EPPA model taxes capital uniformly across sectors.  If the model allowed for differential
taxation across sectors, additional opportunities for violations of the weak double dividend would
present themselves.  We thank a referee for pointing this out.26
Much of the empirical evidence on the double-dividend has been drawn from
the US where energy taxes are very low compared to most other developed countries.
Conclusions drawn from empirical analysis of the US are, therefore, particularly
unlikely to apply elsewhere.  In fact, globally, energy markets are some of the most
heavily distorted markets. Many developed countries heavily tax consumption of fuels
whereas prices on fuels are often subsidized in developing countries as a means of
making energy affordable to consumers.  As both energy taxes and carbon constraints
are directly affecting fuel use, it is perhaps not surprising that correctly representing
distortions in these markets is essential to correctly evaluating the economic impacts
of climate policy. One must be cautious in extrapolating the results from a country
specific analysis to other countries, and one must accurately representing existing
distortions in energy markets to accurately estimate the economic impacts of climate
and fiscal policy.27
Appendix: Modeling Taxes in EPPA
The basic methodology is quite simple and we illustrate it for consumption
taxes
16.  If p is the consumer price for a good and q the producer price, then p and q
are linked by the relation
(A1) p = q + t
where t is a unit tax on the consumption good.  We can re-express the unit tax as a tax
exclusive ad valorem tax (τ):
(A2) τ = t/q






where C represents aggregate consumption.  The tax rate is the difference between the
value of consumption in consumer prices and its value in producer prices divided by
the latter.  In other words, it is the tax revenue divided by the tax base (producer
receipts).
For this consumption tax measure to be comprehensive, we need to capture
both general and specific taxes.  The tax on consumption (τc) is the sum of general
(TG) and specific (TS) taxes divided by private consumption (C) and government
consumption (G) after subtracting consumption taxes paid by consumers and28
government and also subtracting compensation of government workers (GW) which is
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= τ
For OECD countries, collecting the required tax data is relatively straightforward as it
is published annually in their Revenue Statistics series.  The other required data are
published for OECD countries in the National Accounts series.  Obviously, OECD
data can not be relied on for the 65 regions contained in the GTAP data base. United
Nations National Accounts data can substitute for the OECD National Accounts.  A
challenge for GTAP will be to assemble the tax data across countries beyond the
OECD countries.  We hope to show below that the effort will have substantial payoff.
Even if it is not possible to extend the tax data beyond OECD countries, it would be
useful to offer an OECD module with taxes broken out.
The tax on labor income (τL) requires an estimate of the individual income tax
on wages.  Since this is not broken out in the tax data set, Mendoza et al. begin by
calculating the average tax on household income (τh).  This is individual income tax









                                                                                                                                            
16   Mendoza et al. note that Razin and Sadka [35] develop these tax rates from specific tax rates faced
by a representative agent in a general equilibrium model.29
They then assume that the marginal tax rate on all sources of income is the same.  This
is clearly a restrictive assumption but it is not clear a priori what sort of bias this
imparts to the labor income tax rate.  The tax on labor income is then the sum of taxes
on wage income plus payroll taxes (PT) divided by total compensation (including the











Finally, the tax on capital income (τk) is corporate and non-corporate tax
payments divided by total surplus.
17  All capital income distributed to individuals (KD)
is assumed taxed at rate τh.  In addition, corporate tax payments (TC), as well as taxes
on real property and financial transactions (TPF) must be included in the numerator of
the tax rate expression.  The base is total operating surplus in the economy (OS):
(A7)
OS






Mendoza et al. compare their estimates of tax rates to aggregate marginal tax
rates as constructed by Joines [31], Seater [37], and Barro and Sahasakul [10] and find
that the levels are different but that they move similarly over time.  The MRT
estimates are close to those of Joines, lower than Barro-Sahasakul and higher than
Seater's. Table 4 in the main text reports our calculations of tax rates for a number of
OECD countries for 1995.
                                                
17   This tax rate assumes a constant returns to scale aggregate production function and thus the absence
of economic rents.30
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